HE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

THE PROBLEMS OF SMALL NATIONS AND PEACE

A Radio Discussion by WILLIAM HALPERIN
HARLEY MACNAIR *and* SIR BERNARD PARES

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Around the Round Table . . . .

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Harley F. MacNair, professor of Far Eastern history and institutions at the University of Chicago, received his Ph.B. degree at the University of Redlands, his A.M. at Columbia University, and his Ph.D. degree at the University of California. He was associated with St. John's University in Shanghai, China, from 1912 to 1932 and served as head of its department of history and government for a number of years. While in China, Professor MacNair acted in various editorial capacities on the *China Weekly Review*, the *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, and the *Chinese Recorder*, and since 1941 he has been a member of the editorial board of the *Far Eastern Quarterly*. He has been with the University of Chicago since 1928. Professor MacNair is the author of numerous books on the Far East, among which are: *The Chinese Abroad* (1922 and 1933); *China's International Relations and Other Essays* (1926); *Far Eastern International Relations* (in collaboration) (1928 and 1931); *Modern Far Eastern History* (1934); *The Real Conflict between China and Japan* (1938); and *With the White Cross in China* (1939).

Sir Bernard Pares, professor of Russian history at the University of London, is at the present time visiting professor of Russian history at the University of Wisconsin. He was educated at Harrow School and Trinity College, Cambridge. He served for a time as a special correspondent in Russia for the *Spectator* and the *Westminster Gazette*. Sir Bernard was professor of Russian history at Liverpool University until 1919, when he went to the University of London, where he has taught Russian language and history as well as serving as the director of the London School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He is a foundation member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is the author of chapters on Russia in the *Cambridge Modern History*, the author of *A History of Russia*, *The Fall of the Russian Monarchs*, and *Russia* (American ed., 1943).

THE PROBLEMS OF SMALL NATIONS AND PEACE

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MR. HALPERIN: Gentlemen, are the rights, the freedom, and the independence of small nations bound up with the maintenance of peace in a just world order?

Statesmen of the United Nations have answered this question in the affirmative. Only two days ago, President Roosevelt declared that the Big Four—the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China—must be united with and cooperate with all the freedom-loving peoples of Europe and Asia and Africa and the Americas. He went on to say that the rights of every nation, large or small, must be respected and guarded as jealously as are the rights of every individual within our own republic.

What is your reaction to that statement?

MR. MACNAIR: I feel that the American people are to be congratulated upon the arrival by President Roosevelt (at somewhat long last) at an envisagement of the relationship of the whole world —not only the United States, but Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia— in other words, the recognition of the world as a unit, if peace is to be maintained. He shows the advance of his stature as a statesman. He shows that he knows something of history. If the American people are able to cooperate and agree with him and act with him in carrying out this policy, the chances of peace are very good.[1]

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[1] President Roosevelt, in his Christmas Eve address, said, in part:

". . . . Britain, Russia, China, and the United States and their allies represent more than three-quarters of the total population of the earth.

"As long as these four nations with great military power stick together in

SIR BERNARD: I think that there is no doubt that your President has defined the only possible objective for all the efforts that we are making.

I think that we have to discuss today, have we not, the difficulties and the details and to see how near we can get to that objective?

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determination to keep the peace, there will be no possibility of an aggressor nation arising to start another world war.

"But those four powers must be united with and cooperate with all the freedom-loving peoples of Europe and Asia and Africa and the Americas. The rights of every nation, large or small, must be respected and guarded as jealously as are the rights of every individual within our own republic.

"The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it.

"But, at the same time, we are agreed that if force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be applied, for as long as it may be necessary.

"It has been our steady policy, and it is certainly a common-sense policy, that the right of each nation to freedom must be measured by the willingness of that nation to fight for freedom. And today we salute our unseen allies in occupied countries—the underground resistance groups and the armies of liberation. They will provide potent forces against our enemies, when the day of the counter-invasion comes.

"Through the development of science the world has become so much smaller that we have had to discard the geographical yardsticks of the past.

"For instance, through our early history the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were believed to be walls of safety for the United States. Time and distance made it physically possible for us and for the other American republics to obtain and maintain our independence against infinitely stronger powers. . . . .

"The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments of former years did not work. It is my hope that we will not try them again. No—that is too weak—it is my intention to do all that I humanly can as President and commander-in-chief to see to it that these tragic mistakes shall not be made again.

"There have always been cheerful idiots in this country who believed that there would be no more war for us if everybody in America would only return into their homes and lock their front doors behind them. Assuming that their

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MR. HALPERIN: You are quite right, Sir Bernard. However, before we do that, we might examine briefly the question of what kinds of small nations there are. I mean that the phrase "small nations" is bandied around rather loosely and carelessly. I think that it would pay us to examine just what the phrase actually means.

MR. MACNAIR: As I see it, there are four or five (depending upon your point of view) types of small states. For example, there is the "established" small state—the state which has been a small state, which is not ashamed of being a small state, which, so to speak, has won peace and serenity for its soul as a small state.

SIR BERNARD: You are alluding, are you not, to states like Sweden or Holland, which have most honorable histories? Personally, I consider that the body of international law, as far as it has any real existence, owes more to those states than to any others.

MR. HALPERIN: What about such small states in the Far East?

MR. MACNAIR: There is such a state, for example, as Siam, more recently known as Thailand. Or, if we forget the last thirty to thirty-five years of its history, Korea was an essentially self-satisfied small state of the East.

MR. HALPERIN: What is another category of small states?

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motives were of the highest, events have shown how unwilling they were to face the facts.

"The overwhelming majority of all the people in the world want peace—not just a truce, not just an armistice—but peace that is as strongly enforced and as durable as mortal man can make it. If we are willing to fight for peace now, is it not good logic that we should use force if necessary, in the future, to keep the peace?

"I believe, and I think I can say, that the other three great nations who are fighting so magnificently to gain peace are in complete agreement that we must be prepared to keep the peace by force.

"If the people of Germany and Japan are made to realize thoroughly that the world is not going to let them break out again, it is possible, and, I hope, probable, that they will abandon the philosophy of aggression—the belief that they can gain the whole world even at the risk of losing their own souls. . . . ."

BISMARCK'S GERMANY

Mr. MacNair: There is what I would call the "nervous" small state—the type of state which is not too sure of its existence, which perhaps has been in existence or perhaps has not been in existence a long time, but which is not at all sure how long it is going to remain in existence.

Mr. Halperin: Of course, with Mr. Hitler most states are rather nervous, aren't they?

Sir Bernard: That makes me think very much of the Balkan States.

Mr. MacNair: Exactly.

Sir Bernard: And don't forget that nearly all the last wars have come from those states. As a matter of fact, they have not natural limits of population. They encroach upon one another. The result is that the prime minister of such a state is asked by his nation to get all he can of that disputed area. From that comes wars.

CENTRAL EUROPE: 1914

MR. MACNAIR: Then he, in turn, is asked by the prime minister or the dictator of a neighboring state to give up everything that he has gotten.

SIR BERNARD: Exactly.

MR. MACNAIR: That creates more war.

SIR BERNARD: Then, lastly, when Hitler appears at the door, he cannot have any particular friends, and one cannot expect him to throw his state into the conflict.

MR. HALPERIN: Right, gentlemen! What is another category?

MR. MACNAIR: The third category that seems to me distinctly worth mentioning is that of the "specially created" small state, so created by a big state. There are occasions in which it seems desirable (not at all necessary, but desirable) to one of the great powers —for example, Japan—to establish a small state in order not merely

to get further control of that state but to make that state into a buffer state in order to use it as a point from which to leap to still further territory of a neighboring power. In the case of Europe, I think that a state such as Albania would come to mind.

SIR BERNARD: Albania, like Manchukuo, of which you have been speaking, was created to please Austria and more or less to displease Yugoslavia. The other nations gave in to the idea, but there had never been an Albania before.

MR. MACNAIR: No, and there was no intention that there necessarily always should be an Albania . . . .

SIR BERNARD: Certainly not.

MR. MACNAIR: . . . . any more than, in the case of Tokyo politicians, was there any intention that there should always be a Manchukuo. There was to be a Manchukuo as long as Manchukuo was convenient for Tokyo.

MR. HALPERIN: Right.

MR. MACNAIR: In addition to these three types—the established small state, the nervous small state, and the specially created small state—I would add another one: the "aggressive" small state, the type of state which starts out on the make. It is going to get all that it can. It is going to establish itself as an empire as soon as it can. In the case of the Far East, the perfect example of that is, of course, Japan.

SIR BERNARD: The best example in the West is Prussia. The Japanese, I have always thought, were the Prussians of Asia.

MR. MACNAIR: It is not, it seems to me, at all accidental, and certainly not incidental, that those two states—that is, that small state of Prussia at one time and the very recently small state of Japan (in the middle of the nineteenth century)—find themselves in this period of the twentieth century as bedmates, each of them

starting out to better itself and each intending, also, ultimately to knife the other fellow, so that it can get all the spoils.

SIR BERNARD: I would like to add one more category, if I may, which I call "imaginary" nationalities.

MR. MACNAIR: That is good. What do you mean by that?

SIR BERNARD: I happen to know that in Hungary, where there are the Slovaks, who are no relation to the Hungarians at all, they have invented a sort of variation called the "Slo-vi-aks." Those are the Slovaks who wanted to be Hungarian. I am quite certain that there are not any. Or, again, I'll take the word "Russine," which is derived from "Russian" and means "man of Russia." The Germans took that, and they said out of that, "Oh, there's another nationality called 'Russinians.' "

You know that anyone who has to handle these questions is going to hold up his hands in horror because there is such an enormous amount of complex details, some of which are imaginary.

MR. HALPERIN: I think, gentlemen, that we have made it very clear to our listeners on the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE . . . .

MR. MACNAIR: . . . . if we have any.

MR. HALPERIN: I hope that we do; I think we do. . . . . that this whole question of the approach to the problem of small nations is a very difficult one. It is a very complex one, and there are many ingredients and elements that have to be considered in differentiating among these many small nations.

I think that our listeners would be interested in having us discuss another very loosely related aspect of this question, but one, I am sure, which is closely connected in the minds of most people with this problem of the existence of small nations. Does the existence of small nations necessarily make for conflict? Is war inevitable because a continent is divided up into many small states?

MR. MACNAIR: I think that we might equally logically ask if the existence of large states tends to bring about war.

EUROPE AFTER VERSAILLES

MR. HALPERIN: I would tend to say that it depends largely upon the nature of the states, whether big or small.

MR. MACNAIR: Exactly!

MR. HALPERIN: How do you feel about that, Sir Bernard?

EUROPE: JUNE, 1939

SIR BERNARD: To come back to an area that I know, the Balkans, in which so many wars have come, the trouble is that there are two sides—the Bulgarians are against the Serbians; the Rumanians are against the Hungarians; the Poles do not have exactly the same interests as the Czechs. So when there comes one of these great European combinations at war, some of these join one side and some the other. How we are ever going to get them together in a general plan of peace, I must say, I find it very difficult to imagine.

MR. HALPERIN: Of course, it is true, is it not, that the existence of so many small states, particularly in Europe, for example, is due to the fact that at the end of World War I, under the leadership primarily of Woodrow Wilson, the principle of national self-determination was generally indorsed? Does that not take us to a discussion of the meaning of the principle of self-determination?

MR. MACNAIR: Do you mean to infer that, because President

Wilson suggested that the ideal, or even the practice, of self-determination should enter into the thought of statesmen and to the degree in which self-determination was brought about, that contributed to another world war?

MR. HALPERIN: No, I would not say that. I think that the principle of self-determination from a moral point of view is entirely justifiable. In fact, I think that it is indispensable to a just and stable world order.

SIR BERNARD: I feel that there is no principle which offers a better basis for a just peace. I think that we can probably, can we not, all three agree on that?

MR. HALPERIN: Yes, I think that we do.

SIR BERNARD: But it depends on how it is applied.

MR. MACNAIR: You, Sir Bernard, as a historian, particularly a historian of Russia, might, it seems to me, have some suggestions to make with respect to the inference which has been made thus far —that the principle of self-determination is essentially modern. It is my impression that self-determination is a little bit older, say, than President Wilson or even the United States.

SIR BERNARD: I can go back to the fifteenth century, when the ruler of Russia, if I am right, said that anyone who spoke Russian ought to be in Russia. That sounds very much like the same thing.

But then I would make a big leap, and I would say that when this principle really became a European one was in the French Revolution. What would you say?

MR. HALPERIN: I quite agree, but, of course, it is true that, in terms of the present situation and in terms of what we had on our hands throughout the world, primarily in Europe, just on the eve of World War II, it was the Wilsonian policy.

SIR BERNARD: That is right.

Mr. Halperin: That is what figured so largely in the determination of the frontiers of so many of these small states in Europe.

Mr. MacNair: I am inclined, Halperin, to disagree with what you have just suggested. I do not believe that the number of small states, whether the number is great or whether it is small, has anything definitely or precisely to do with the outbreak of war.

Mr. Halperin: I did not suggest that. I raised the question, and then I went on to add that it depends upon the character of the state, not upon its size.

Mr. MacNair: I was going to suggest that it depends basically upon the attitude of the little states toward the big states and of the big states toward the little states, just as peace within a household or within a city or within a country depends upon the attitudes of the different groups and the different individuals toward one another.

Mr. Halperin: Quite right, but I think that, before we go on to discuss the relations of the big states and the little states, we might spend just another moment on the principle of self-determination. It involves many things, does it not—territorial matters, economic matters? There is the question of the mixture of populations —an ethnic problem there that is extremely complex. Isn't that so?

Sir Bernard: Most certainly. I think that you cannot do better than to take self-determination where it applies. If you get parts of the east of Europe, where the population is higgledy-piggledy, all mixed up—small settlement of Poles, small settlement of Germans, large environment of agricultural Russian-Ukrainian population, or then, again, Rumanian, and so on—it is all so mixed up that you cannot settle all the questions always by peoples. It seems to me quite impossible.

Then I simply want to say that self-determination is not the only thing. There are other questions which we can tackle when we get to them—economics, geography, and so on. All I think is that it was exaggerated.

THE FAR EAST

SOVIET RUSSIA
ALASKA
CHINA
JAPAN
HAINAN (JAP)
FORMOSA (JAP)
INDIA
SAIGON (FR)
PHILIPPINES (US)
SINGAPORE (BR)
DUTCH EAST INDIES
WAKE
MIDWAY (US)
GUAM (US)
YAP
WOTJE
PONAPE
TRUK
PALAU (JAP)
KUSAIE
JALUIT
HAWAII (US)
SOLOMON (BR) IS.
AUSTRALIA

MR. HALPERIN: Quite right.

MacNair, what about the Far East? How has this principle worked out in the Far East—this principle of self-determination?

MR. MACNAIR: It depends upon whether you want to take an immediate point of view or whether you want to take what might be called a historical point of view.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that our listeners would be interested in getting as general a presentation as you can give them.

MR. MACNAIR: On the one side, if you want to go back momentarily some distance, you have the idea of China as the center of the Eastern world, developing civilization among the fringe peoples, looking upon those fringe peoples as subordinate but not peoples who are to be constantly interfered with and not peoples who are constantly to be used for ulterior purposes. It was a question largely of safeguarding the state of China and safeguarding Chinese culture.

In modern times, on the contrary, with the rise of Japan to the position to which it had risen by, say, the end of the war of 1914–19, there was a different situation. There, as intimated a moment ago, it was the case of a small nation with a big ideology; a small nation with a very big head; a small nation with a very big mouth; and a nation which was on the make—one which intended to step on the toes of everybody around it and grab as much as it could from its neighbors.

In a case like that, you can see that the position of a small nation is very different in the nineteenth century from, say, the position of a small nation in the thirteenth century. The two are quite different because the conditions change. I think that that applies to Europe as it does to other parts of the world.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that we might turn now to the very basic question—the most basic question of all, I think—the attitude of the big powers toward their small neighbors.

We know, of course, that the United States has evolved a policy in that direction, as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine, with respect to the smaller nations of this hemisphere.

We also have, of course, the statements of President Roosevelt regarding our interests in the preservation and protection of the freedom and institutions of smaller nations throughout the world.

Sir Bernard, what would you say about the attitude of Russia on this question?

SIR BERNARD: I think that it may be much more favorable than people imagine, because, in the old days of the hundred and eighty-five nationalities of Russia, only one got any attention at all. Stalin belongs to one of the smallest, the Georgian, and he has seen to it, personally, that there is no racial discrimination whatsoever inside Russia. In fact, they go very far. Each of these little countries, however small, is a kind of little state of itself, a national state, and has its own national language as the language of teaching in schools. I think that that is important.

MR. MACNAIR: You raise an extremely interesting question, from my point of view—something which we have not thought of previously. You envisage the existence of small states which have been collected into the form of a great state. In other words, you take the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and you are accepting as falling within our purview and within our definition the idea of these various peoples within the Soviet Union as constituting states.

Most of us, it seems to me, think of a state as something which constitutes a unit, a completely detached, independent—shall we say, sovereign?—unit.

SIR BERNARD: You have to know what is the case of each of these different units, and I do hope that the people who have to settle the peace questions will have enough of that knowledge.

Let me take two contrasting examples. There is no point in the

RUSSIAN WESTERN BOUNDARIES

1914-41

Russians' ever being master of Poles. It is wrong; it does not work; it is only a trouble to both concerned.

MR. HALPERIN: You feel that that is the Russian attitude today?

SIR BERNARD: I think so, simply because I do not think that Stalin is such a fool as to create an absolute sore on his very frontier, which would give a chance for all sorts of German intrigue.

But let me go on for a moment and say that it is a different story if you talk of the small Baltic States, because Estonia never possessed the elements of a state until it fell away from Russia, because it was conquered by Germany. It will always be like a small animal cowering between Russia and Germany. They did not even have a governing class of their own; it was German.

That shows the difference between one question and another.

MR. MACNAIR: I am impressed, Sir Bernard, with the detached, cynical attitude which you take. I am not sure that you intended to be that cynical. Perhaps you did not even realize how cynical you are.

SIR BERNARD: Not at all.

MR. MACNAIR: I, therefore, raise the question in order to give you a chance to clarify the atmosphere. In what you have just said, the inference is unavoidable that Russia, at least—if not other big states—inclines to be moral if it is convenient to be moral or inclines to be immoral if it can get away with it. In other words, if you can swallow something and digest it, then you are all right. If you cannot swallow it, and if you cannot digest it, then you are statesman enough to realize it, but you are not motivated by morality.

SIR BERNARD: Frankly, I cannot see anything in that which inspired what I remarked which has any reference to what you have just said. I want to say that if I were an Estonian I should not want independence.

MR. MACNAIR: How do you know what you would want? You

are not an Estonian, and, therefore, how can you arrogate to yourself the right of judgment?

SIR BERNARD: I say that if I were an Estonian, I should not want independence.

MR. HALPERIN: The important thing, is it not, is that the opportunity for self-determination should be granted to Estonians as well as to other small peoples? If the Estonians should decide that they wish to be incorporated into the Soviet Union, that would be their business, wouldn't it?

MR. MACNAIR: Yes, but suppose that the Georgians decide that they do not want to be incorporated. Should they, then, be permitted to withdraw?

MR. HALPERIN: I would say "Yes." If the principle of self-determination is to be a valid one, a workable one, it should apply indiscriminately.

MR. MACNAIR: Would you apply that to the United States? Suppose Rhode Island or Texas decides that it no longer wishes to be part of the American nation.

SIR BERNARD: Or one of your racial groups?

MR. MACNAIR: Yes, or one of our racial groups? Then do you feel that the idea of self-determination is so noble that it should be carried out?

MR. HALPERIN: I think that that is a question which is based upon something which does not at all exist.

MR. MACNAIR: Well, it is pleasant if you think so.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that it does not exist.

MR. MACNAIR: The Japanese, we understand, have been working for several years among one of our elements in the United States, not necessarily successfully, but they thought that they were going to be successful.

PEOPLES OF THE SMALL COUNTRIES

EUROPE BEFORE WORLD WAR II

The Balkans





MR. HALPERIN: I think, gentlemen, that we perhaps had better get on with our next topic, although the one we have just been discussing obviously is most interesting.

MR. MACNAIR: Whenever you hit anything embarrassing, it is better to pass on quickly. Let us pass.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that we will have to turn now to the question of the degree to which small nations can really achieve independence in a world that is as real as we know it to be—that is, the degree to which they can achieve the right to self-determination; to which they can choose their own form of government; to which they can have their own frontiers. In the last analysis, inasmuch as the balance of power is in the hands of the big powers, inasmuch as economic power is largely in the hands of the big powers, the question arises of how independent these small states really can ever be.

SIR BERNARD: It has been suggested that I am cynical. I will say that I am a realist.

MR. MACNAIR: That is what all cynics say.

SIR BERNARD: I cannot see how there can be any permanent

settlement or any security of peace for the smaller peoples unless the big ones agree that there shall be. Otherwise, the small peoples, whom I cannot condemn for it in any way, are put in the position of yielding to force time and time again.

Mr. Halperin: Yes; but, quite apart from the question of the attitude of the big powers, there is the other matter of whether, granting that the big powers are willing to protect the political integrity of the smaller states and their frontiers and so on, they can, in the very nature of things, pursue an independent course.

Take, for example, the case of Austria after the last war. Austria, as you know, was virtually a head without a body. It was set up as an independent state, largely against its own will because at that time, of course, it did want to be joined with Germany. Yet Austria, throughout that period after 1919, was in constant difficulties large-



ly because she was not an economically viable unit—simply because she could not, under the circumstances, maintain her own existence.

Sir Bernard: Let me give the instance of Estonia. Estonia happens to contain the biggest cotton mill which there ever was in Russia. It used to have a market to the Pacific, and now it has a market of a mile and a half, because there intervenes the Soviet frontier, and, of course, it is subject to every kind of internal tariff. So it has been practically ruined economically.

Mr. MacNair: I think that a better example would be the case of Korea, which forms, practically speaking, an almost ideal situation with respect to the relationship of a small state to a great state. I do not want to take time to go into details, but all I would suggest is that, for several centuries, Korea was an independent, sovereign state, under its own king; but at the same time it maintained an attitude of inferiority, which it freely and frankly and proudly admitted, with respect to China, which it looked toward as a sort of parent-state. But China, being a parent-state, did not feel free to arrogate to itself the right to interfere in Korea. It was only

on the rarest occasions that China did in any wise intervene. It was more of a form. The Koreans on occasion sent messengers to China to announce that the king had died, to announce the accession of a new king, or to announce even the accession of a new dynasty. The Chinese emperor, in his turn, freely acknowledged the existence, recognized this new ruling house or this new ruler, and gave a patent of nobility to him, and the situation went on, perfectly frank and friendly.

There, it seems to me, you have a really beautiful illustration of the possibility of a tiny state which is maintaining its statehood alongside a great state which is perfectly willing that it shall so remain.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that that is very important, because it certainly makes it clear to us, and to our listeners, that the emergence of a strong, powerful China does not imply danger to the independence of the smaller nations of the Far East.

MR. MACNAIR: That, I think, is very true.

MR. HALPERIN: What would you say, Sir Bernard, about Britain's attitude in all this?

SIR BERNARD: That is just what I wanted to raise. What is the sort of framework in which small nations can find real security? Security is, in my opinion, obviously what everyone would like in this world of ours, secured by means of an agreement of those who can disturb that security—that is, the greater states.

What happened last time, as you remember, was that Wilson was not supported by public opinion here. A wonderful, idealistic scheme, which might have given real results, was in consequence crippled. For my country the consequence was that we had to bear a whole lot of the responsibility of trying to make that work somehow.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that, of course, there is an element there that must be mentioned, too, in the British case. While the British

did have this tremendous load to carry, if they were to attempt to enforce some sort of system of security in Europe, they were also somewhat deluded, for they regarded certain areas which turned out to be very vital to them as outside the area in which they must be concerned.

SIR BERNARD: Such as?

MR. HALPERIN: For example, in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1938, when Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that this little country from Central Europe was beyond the pale of British interest.

SIR BERNARD: That is just it. He even said we did not know anything about it. Let me just explain what I mean. You see, we took on all sorts of commitments to these smaller states. We really, in my opinion, disarmed more honestly than any of the countries in Europe. France did not; Germany rearmed. In 1940 we were left defending our own beaches, as Churchill put it, with no alliance in the field, no ally in the field, except plucky little Greece, with any amount of commitments which we could not carry out and with hardly enough strength to save our own shores from invasion.

MR. MACNAIR: I think that that point is very well taken, Sir Bernard, but I would like to suggest, even though the time is growing very brief, that there is another extremely important factor which has not been mentioned and which is worth mentioning as a warning factor—namely, the question of what I would call "avoidance of staticity."

At the end of the last world war we had a situation in which there was an attempt on the part of the victors to freeze the world, not with the point of view of cold but with the point of view of fixing them forever, and the League of Nations did not provide for changes.

It seems to me that we must consider, hereafter, that in the relations between the big states and the little states there must be pro-

vision for change. In other words, we must avoid any attempt at staticity. What do you think?

MR. HALPERIN: I agree entirely with you.

SIR BERNARD: So do I.

MR. HALPERIN: I think that we must always remember, also, that peace is indivisible—that the peace of small nations is bound up with the peace of big ones and that any breach of order at the expense of a small nation will lead to disastrous consequences for all the world, the big and little states alike.

MR. MACNAIR: In other words, in a sense, the relations among states are like the relations among individuals.

MR. HALPERIN: They must be governed basically by moral law.

MR. MACNAIR: By "moral law," and moral law is not diverted from rights. The individuals have rights and the groups have rights; big states have rights and little states have rights.

SIR BERNARD: Certainly. The Czechs had rights at Munich, but they were not consulted.

MR. MACNAIR: The great nations did not agree.

SIR BERNARD: Quite right.

The ROUND TABLE, *oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the* ROUND TABLE *speakers.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. The President in his Christmas message said that the big powers have the responsibility and should use force to keep the peace. In your opinion will this result in peace and independence for the small nations? What part should small states have in deciding world affairs?
2. What problems do the small nations pose for the peace? What are the chief issues concerning small nations which must be settled if another world war is to be avoided? What responsibilities must the United States and other great powers assume toward small nations?
3. Do you think that the British, Dutch, French, Belgian, and American empires should be restored after the war? Can they be restored? Is the freedom of colonial peoples a war aim? Discuss.
4. What are the arguments for and against the present systems of empire? Do you think that imperialism is bad for the subject peoples because of political oppression and economic exploitation? Or would you say that in many instances enlightened economic self-interest makes imperialism beneficial to the dependent colonial peoples?
5. In what sense are the Balkans a political microcosm of the European problem of peace? What should be the relations of the small nations in the post-war world? Should they be allowed to federate, or should a policy of world federation be urged for large and small powers alike?
6. Looking back over the last twenty years, what do you think of high tariffs? What are the dangers and advantages of economic nationalism as practiced before the war? To what degree should barriers to international trade be lowered? Is free trade a desirable goal to be worked for?
7. Do you think that a principle of any peaceful society is that "the power of all shall be used for the defense of each"? To what degree is the argument for the rights of small states a moral one? What seem to be the present attitudes of Russia, China, Britain, and the United States toward small states?
8. What is the principle of "self-determination"? In what kind of situation can it satisfactorily be applied? What are the consequences of self-determination for world government and world peace? What limitations on the rights of national sovereignty are necessary for a durable political reconstruction?

More on This Topic

CORBETT, PERCY, *Post-war Worlds.* (Institute of Pacific Relations.) New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942. *An analysis of the leading proposals, including those for world federation, with suggestions by the author.*

DEAN, VERA MICHELES, "European Agreements for Post-war Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 15, 1942. *Gives the texts of the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav federation agreements.*

HOGG, QUINTIN, "British Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1943. *Discusses the Conservative party policies.*

HULL, CORDELL, "Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests," *Vital Speeches*, October 1, 1943. *States the record and aims of American diplomacy.*

KAUFMANN, FRITZ, "Central Europe after the War," *Free World*, October, 1943. *Analyzes the significance of Russian opposition to political federations in Central and Eastern Europe.*

KOHN, HANS, "Realities of War and Peace," *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1943. *Argues for a nationalistic policy of enlightened self-interest.*

PARES, BERNARD, *Russia.* New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1941. *A history of the Soviet regime.*

PRIBICHEVICH, STOYAN, "Allied Strategy in Yugoslavia," *Fortune*, September, 1943. *Reports on the political developments that have brought the British government to a conspicuous shift in its policy on Yugoslavian affairs.*

SFORZA, CARLO, "A Free Italy," *Free World*, July, 1943. *Points to the historical traditions of brotherhood among the European peoples on which the future Europe may be built.*

———, "Italy and Her Neighbors after the War," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1943. *Advocates a union between Spain, France, and Italy.*

"Southeastern Asia and the Philippines," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1943. *Thirteen articles on the economics and politics of the Far East.*

TODOROV, KOSTA, "Can the Balkans Be Unified?" *American Mercury*, September, 1943. *Says that nearly all the peoples of this region want federation.*

"The United Nations and the Future," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1943. *Seventeen articles on the relations of the United States and the United Nations by prominent authorities.*

The People Say....

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "Politics, Parties, and Issues: 1944," broadcast December 19, 1943.*

*

Impressed

I was tremendously impressed with the forum that I have just heard and would like to go over it again. Will you be sure that I receive a copy as soon as possible?—*A listener from New Haven, Connecticut.*

*

Frank and Fearless

I enjoyed the program on politics and political parties very much. I think that a frank and fearless discussion of our political problems is vital. Keep up the good work.—*A listener from Flagstaff, Arizona.*

*

Agreed

I was very much impressed by the statement explaining how the League of Nations was sabotaged and placing the blame where it is due. I also agreed with the idea that the post–Civil War period and program were the causes of the situation, both socially and industrially, that exists in the South today, seventy-five years later.

It is too bad that the men who killed the League of Nations and the World Court and so on were not of draft age in this war, so that they could reap the reward of their act, instead of their sons' and grandsons' having to bear the brunt of the battle! —*A listener from Atlanta, Georgia.*

*

No Dodging, This Time

The discussion of political parties and issues was well handled today. The subject should be continued some other time. It is up to the people to discipline their parties. We want no dodging of the issues, this time.—*A listener from Spokane, Washington.*

*

Did Not Mention the Important Issues

I have listened with great interest to today's ROUND TABLE discussion on the 1944 political issues. What we laymen (American citizens) consider should be the most important issues were not even mentioned. First we consider it important whether we should return to a sane and sensible government under the Constitution and governed by laws passed by a Congress elected by the people or whether we shall have government by executive decree and regulations by bureaucrats not elected by the people. It is also important whether we shall

retain our independence as a nation and rebuild our own country, taking care of our own people first, or whether we surrender our independence to become a subject to a world organization of nations and use our already depleted natural resources to rebuild a wrecked world and put down our American people to a level of depressed peasants and the paupers of the world. . . . . —*A listener from New Ringgold, Pennsylvania.*

*

Arouse the Masses?

It was said by one of the speakers that the Democratic and Republican parties would not find it necessary to stand for any definite program unless forced to do so by a leftist labor or farmer-labor party. Is it not also true that there will be no such labor party unless there is pressure from a point still farther to the left—a Socialist or Communist party with a knack for arousing the masses?—*A listener from Powers Lake, North Dakota.*

*

Spirited and Intelligent

We have just listened to your spirited and intelligent ROUND TABLE discussion on politics, and we would like to have a copy of the program for further perusal.—*A listener from Wadsworth, Ohio.*

*

Will Vote If Have Chance

I have two sons in the service who, I know, will vote in the coming election if given a chance. One of them is overseas. I want to send them each a copy of the discussion of last Sunday in order that they may know something of the situation at home.—*A listener from Minneapolis, Minnesota.*

*

Most Interesting

It was a most interesting half-hour's discussion of politics. I think that every senator and congressman should receive a copy of this broadcast *in toto.—A listener from Wheatley, Long Island.*

*

Liked the Plan

I especially liked the id community of interest in a l by Roosevelt and Willkie. would let out a lot of people the general public believe are their "leaders" but who would prefer a Hitler to our present administration. We are reminded of certain southerners fighting for democracy while not wanting millions to have the right to vote. We are reminded of Alf Landon, who wants to know all about the Moscow discussions. Does he think that with his eight votes he is entitled to have the plans communicated to Hitler?

Congress at the present time hardly represents the people generally. It is definitely representing lobbyists. They cannot be representing the public as such when we read their attitude on taxation, subsidies, and so on. . . . . —*A listener from Brooklyn, New York.*

THE ROUND TABLE NETWORK

City	Call Letters	Kilo-cycles	City	Call Letters	Kilo-cycles
1:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME					
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Oh[illegible]	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S[illegible]	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mi[illegible]	WWJ	950	Springfield, [illegible]	WBZ	1030
Florence, S[illegible]	WOLS	1230	Springfield, [illegible]	WIZL	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350
12:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME					
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240
11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME					
Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	770	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Boseman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240
10:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME					
Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			
STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION					
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Minneapolis, Minn.	WLB	770	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
BY TRANSCRIPTION VIA SHORT WAVE					
Anchorage, Alaska	KFQD	790	Juneau, Alaska	KINY	1450
Fairbanks, Alaska	KFAR	610	Ketchikan, Alaska	KTAN	930

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